In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of "choice fatigue" on decision making. We exploit a natural experiment in which voters face the same contest at di¤erent ballot positions due to di¤erences in the number of local issues on their ballot. Facing more decisions before a given contest signi…cantly increases the tendency to abstain or rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo or the …rst listed candidate. We estimate that, without choice fatigue, abstentions would decrease by 10% and 6.25% of the 352 propositions in our dataset would have passed rather than failed.
Introduction
Do people …nd the pure act of decision making to be exhausting or e¤ort-consuming? If so, how do peoples'decisions change after they have just made other decisions? In this paper, we examine this e¤ect, which we call "choice fatigue," in an important …eld environment. We exploit a natural experiment that generates conditionally random variation in the number of decisions a voter must make before reaching her decision on a speci…c contest on the ballot. We provide evidence that making more decisions prior to a particular decision increases the likelihood of abstention from the decision as well as the reliance on heuristics (such as choosing the status-quo) in decision-making.
Decisions in many economic domains are made in sequential order and therefore might be a¤ected by choice fatigue. The e¤ect of cognitive load on di¤erent decisions has been discussed in other recent work in behavioral economics and consumer psychology. For example, Levav et al. (2010) …nd in a …eld experiment that German car buyers customizing an Audi are more likely to rely on defaults -and thus spend more money on the car -if decisions with more alternatives are placed at the beginning of the sequence of customization decisions. Also, Iyengar & Kamenica (2010) …nd that employees at …rms with more funds to choose from in their 401(k) plan allocate more money to bond funds and less to equity funds.
Similarly, in the voting literature, many have noted that voters are less likely to cast a vote as they move down the ballot, a phenomenon known as "roll-o¤." (Bowler & Donovan 1998 , Bowler et al. 1992 , Selb 2009 ). For example, it is well known that voters are less likely to cast a vote on contests later in the ballot, a phenomenon known as "roll-o¤" (Burnham 1965) . While this e¤ect might be due to fatigue, it also might be due to the fact that contest saliency generally decreases with ballot position (Donovan & Happ 1992 , Bullock & Dunn 1996 . Additionally, some have suggested that choice fatigue might cause people to vote di¤erently (Bowler & Donovan 1998 , Selb 2009 , although the evidence is mixed (Mueller 1969) . As these studies simply correlate ballot length and aggregate votes (or voter intent) on propositions across many elections, the result might be due to di¤erences in the types of propositions that appear on long ballots. Therefore, although there has been much work on the subject, the e¤ect of fatigue on voting has never been convincingly causally identi…ed.
Ideally, one would address these questions with a …eld experiment in which similar voters are presented with the exact same contest at random ballot positions. 1 Then it would be possible to determine the pure behavioral impact of shifting ballot position: Are voters more likely to abstain on a contest if it is presented further down the ballot? Furthermore, if they do choose to vote, would they vote di¤erently? Unfortunately, given that ballot ordering is determined by legislated rules, a …eld experiment would be nearly impossible to implement.
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Rather than running a …eld experiment, our paper solves this identi…cation problem by exploiting similar variation found in a natural experiment in California. As a result of ballot ordering rules, Californian voters in the same county can see the same contest at di¤erent ballot positions as a result of di¤erences in the number of local issues faced by each voter. These di¤erences can be seen as random shocks to a contest's ballot position, particularly when controlling for precinct voting behavior over time. 3 To analyze this variation, we constructed a unique 1.1 million-observation panel dataset that contains the ballot order, vote share, and participation in every contest in every precinct in San Diego County between 1992 and . This large dataset allows us to use contest and precinct …xed e¤ects and tightly estimate the behavioral e¤ect of each change in ballot order.
To understand our source of variation, consider Proposition 35, a California statewide ballot measure in the 2000 general election concerning the use of private contractors in public works projects. 4 This proposition appeared on every ballot in the state. However, because of the di¤erences in the number of contests in the overlaying local political jurisdictions in which each voter lives, Proposition 35 appeared at di¤erent ballot positions for di¤erent voters. For example, voters in San Diego County saw Proposition 35 listed anywhere between ninth and nineteenth on the ballot. 5 Figure 1 illustrates the within-election variation in the ballot position of Proposition 35 across precincts.
Foreshadowing the general results of our paper, as Proposition 35 moved down the ballot, the choice behavior of voters changed. Figure 2 shows a positive and signi…cant association between the ballot position of Proposition 35 and the percentage of undervotes (abstentions) and of "no" votes (the status quo) in the respective precincts. The …gure also shows that no such positive relationship exists across the same precincts in the average fraction of would involve a randomization of position that does not violate voters'expectations and cause confusion. Across all contests in our dataset, we …nd that lowering a given contest by one position on the ballot increases precinct-level undervotes by 0.13 points. Given the average ballot position (15.7) and level of undervotes of contests in our data (21.6%), this suggests that choice fatigue is responsible for 9.3% of undervotes in these contests. We also …nd that voters are more likely to use decision shortcuts as they become fatigued. For example, in statewide and local propositions ("yes-no" decisions), lowering a given proposition by one position increases votes for the status quo ("no" votes) by 0.11 points. 6 In statewide and local o¢ ce races (multi-candidate decisions), lowering a given contest by one position increases the tendency to vote for the …rst candidate listed for that contest by 0.05 points.
To understand the economic impact of these results, consider that the average proposition is presented 26.8 positions from the top of the ballot. This estimate suggests that the percentage of "no" votes would decrease by an average of 2.9 percentage points if these contests appeared at the top of the ballot. Therefore, given the ballot position of each proposition, we calculate that 22 of the 352 propositions in our dataset would have passed rather than failed if the proposition was presented to voters as the …rst contest on the ballot. Furthermore, we calculate that this status-quo e¤ect is nearly tripled in contests with no campaign expenditures, in which voters are likely making decisions only when they enter the voting booth.
To better understand the relevance of this paper's research contribution, the next section discusses the relevant previous literature on decision making and rollo¤. Section 3 discusses the dataset. The empirical results are broken into two categories. In section 4, we investigate the e¤ect of choice fatigue on undervotes, which represents the "decision to decide." In section 5, we discuss the e¤ects of choice fatigue on the actual decision, given that a decision was made. The implications of the results for political economics and theories of decision making, as well as practical concerns for the design of electoral institutions are discussed in section 6.
Previous Literature
The central hypothesis of this paper is that a contextual variable, the number of previous decisions made in the choice environment, can a¤ect decision outcomes. As we are concerned with the e¤ect of this variable on both abstentions and the decision itself, we will review the relevant literature in both of these areas. In both cases, given that the application in this paper is voter decision making, we …rst discuss relevant research in this area and later cover more broadly motivating work in consumer psychology and economic choice.
The E¤ect of Fatigue on "Deciding to Decide" Three explanations are o¤ered in the existing literature on the e¤ects of ballot composition on participation in individual contests: information, confusion and fatigue. Within this body of work the fatigue e¤ects cannot be disentangled from other factors because of methodological limitations that disallow any sort of causal inference. We discuss two representative papers here. 7 First, Darcy and Schneider (1989) study the 1986 Oklahoma gubernatorial general election in which the new use of …ll-in-the-bubble optical voting technology by three counties placed the high-salience U.S. Senator contest in obscure or unusual places on the ballot. This drop in ballot position led to 3 to 7 points more undervotes in comparison to the counties using lever machines. 8 Given that the choice of using optical voting technology is endogenous and that the author's main hypothesis is that the irregular positioning led to confusion, it is di¢ cult to draw a predictive conclusion about the e¤ects of fatigue. However, the authors do present an example of how the relative position of a contest on the ballot may be important for voter choice.
Second, Bowler, Donovan & Happ (1992) discuss how voter fatigue may in ‡uence abstentions. They follow Downs (1957) and Magleby (1989 Magleby ( , 1984 in arguing that voting is driven by a cost-bene…t analysis, leading voters to resort to cheap decisions (such as abstaining) in some contests. The paper regresses roll-o¤ on the ballot position of California propositions from 1974-1988 and …nds that roll-o¤ rises and then falls with ballot position. However, as a proposition's position is determined by the order in which it quali…ed, less important propositions are likely to appear lower on the ballot. Therefore, it is not possible to separately identify the e¤ects of ballot position and saliency. In fact, these limitations point to the advantage of our approach, which allows us to control for all proposition-speci…c characteristics by looking at changes in ballot order of the same proposition.
Apart from fatigue, several authors look directly at the role of information in abstention. For example, Coupé and Noury (2004) use data from a survey experiment to …nd the "pure" e¤ect of information on the decision to abstain. Although not an application based on empirically observed voter choice behavior, their conclusions are intuitive and suggest that those with less information about a particular survey question are more likely to abstain. Wattenberg, McAllister & Salvanto (2000) use survey data and argue that voters with less information are more likely to abstain. They characterize voters as "treat[ing] voting as if 7 Other references include: Burnham (1965) , Donovan & Happ (1992) , Bullock & Dunn (1996) , Bowler and Donovan (1998) , Nicholson (2003), and Selb (2009) . 8 The data analysis is relatively informal, with no standard errors are given or hypothesis tests performed.
it were a test, picking out the questions that they can answer."
As there are many economic environments in which sequential decisions are made in a choice environment, there is previous work in behavioral economics and consumer psychology on the role of similar contexts in decision making. For example, Boatwright and Nunes (2001) provide additional evidence that decisions made sequentially can be a¤ected by the attributes of individual choices. They …nd in a natural experiment at an online grocer that reductions in the assortment within 42 product categories increase sales by an average of 11%. Iyengar & Lepper (2000) spearheaded the literature in choice overload, …nding that reductions in the variety of jams (and separately, chocolates) in a tasting booth lead to more sales, a …nding supported by research in other contexts. 9 These examples suggest that larger decision sets can lead decision makers to abstain from making a decision. Dhar (1997a Dhar ( , 1997b …nds that preference for a "no-choice" option (choice deferral) increases when there is no single alternative in the choice set that has a clear advantage.
E¤ect of Fatigue on Decisions
For motivation on understanding how voters' decisions are a¤ected by choice fatigue, it is …rst useful to discuss the literature on voter choice in low information environments. Having no information about candidates or a proposition does not imply that voters will choose a candidate randomly. Instead, there are many contest characteristics available to them that they can use to make a low-information decision about how to vote. Cues that may a¤ect voter decisions are candidate ordering (Ho & Imai 2008 , Meredith & Salant 2011 , King & Leigh 2009 , Koppell & Steen 2005 , Krosnick et al. 2004 , ballot con…gura-tions/design (Walker 1966) , and candidate cues such as gender (McDermott 1997) , ballot designation/incumbency (McDermott 2005) , race/ethnicity (Washington 2006 , Engstrom & Caridas 1991 , Vanderleeuw& Utter 1993 and partisanship (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991) . Additionally, these e¤ects may be exacerbated without other cues (Miller & Krosnick 1998) . Our goal is not to examine the e¤ect on these cues on decisions, but how these types of characteristics might interact with fatigue to a¤ect voter decision making. Speci…cally, we will focus on the e¤ect of fatigue level on choosing the status quo or the …rst candidate, as these are arguably the cues that require the least e¤ort to determine. 10 9 Other references in this literature include Bertrand et al. (2005) , and Gourville and Soman (2001) . Furthermore, theoretical arguments (Kamenica 2008 ) and experimental evidence (Salgado 2005 ) exist for why consumers may prefer smaller choice sets over larger ones. 10 Candidates are listed in a particular order, and this order is observed with virtually no e¤ort. Similarly, the status quo option on propositions is always "no," and requires no e¤ort to determine. On the other hand, to make a decision based on the candidates'gender, the voter must read each candidate's name, determine A few papers have noted a relationship between ballot length and the tendency to vote for the status-quo. Bowler & Donovan (1998) show that there is a relationship between aggregate "no" votes on propositions in past Californian and Oregonian elections and the number of propositions in that election. Similarly, Selb (2009) uses a random-e¤ects heteroskedastic probit model on Swiss survey data about self-reported positions on propositions to …nd a marginally signi…cant increase in the number of "no" votes when the ballot contains more propositions.
11 Clearly, as this data is aggregated up to the election-level, it is di¢ cult to draw causal conclusions.
More broadly, previous research has examined the e¤ect of cognitive exertion on the ability to make decisions and the potential resulting bias in observed choice in a variety of domains. For example, Levav et al. (2010) …nd in a …eld experiment with buyers of Audi cars in Germany that the sequencing of car customization decisions a¤ects outcomes. Customers in their experiment are randomly assigned to treatments in which the …rst 8 of 67 decisions over car attributes are ordered either in increasing or decreasing order of the number of attributes available for each decision. The paper …nds that customers in the "Hi-Lo" treatment (decisions with more alternatives …rst) are more likely to take the default choices than those in the "Lo-Hi" (decisions with fewer alternatives …rst) treatment. In addition, the reliance on default options causes the "Hi-Lo" customers to spend more money on the car.
Complementing the evidence in political science, economics and marketing, survey researchers have examined similar issues with regard to how survey respondents behave as they navigate through a survey. Dating from Simon (1953), Krosnick (1999) describes survey subjects as falling into two categories: optimizers and satis…cers. Although optimizers are thorough in their decision making, other types of people are less thoughtful as they provide responses to questions. Krosnick describes these people as "agree[ing] merely to provide answers, with no intrinsic motivation toward high quality." These "respondents may satisfy their desires to provide high-quality data after answering a few questions, and become increasingly fatigued and distracted as a questionnaire progresses." As a result, these respondents rely more on shortcuts as such as choosing the status quo or "no opinion" for questions appearing later on in a questionnaire (Ying 1989) . the likelihood that the candidate is male, and compare these likelihoods across candidates.
11 Interestingly, Selb notes that "this relatively weak …nding casts some doubts on Bowler and Donovan's previous results."
Data
The analysis uses a precinct-level panel dataset of participation and number of votes cast for every federal, statewide and local contest on the primary and general election ballot in San Diego County, California between 1992 and 2006. This dataset is unique and novel. Importantly, it depicts the number of votes across the entire menu of contests on the ballot, the principal reason that ballot position e¤ects can be identi…ed.
Constructing the dataset was a major endeavor: data for each election are reported in varying formats and identi…ers for candidate vote totals (and thus contests and jurisdictions) were created manually. In total, there are 3.1 million precinct-contest-option observations. As undervotes are determined at the contest-level, the analysis in section 4 uses a collapsed dataset of 1.1 million precinct-contest observations, which includes participation and number of votes cast for every contest. The ballot position for every precinct-contest observation is inferred from the rules in §13109 of the Elections Code of the California State Constitution (the exact rules are discussed in detail in section 4).
The data source is the Statement of the Vote/O¢ cial Canvas published by the San Diego County Registrar of Voters on their website.
12 San Diego County was chosen because of data availability and the large variation across precincts and elections in the number of overlaying local political jurisdictions. Obtaining electronic or paper …les has proven di¢ cult in some counties, mainly for lack of preservation of records and limitations on public access. Other counties have records, but would not exhibit the necessary variation to identify ballot position e¤ects. For example, San Francisco does have electronic precinct-level data, but lacks special districts within the City and County required to observe the same contest at di¤erent positions on the ballot.
There are some issues with the data. For example, the turnout data by party in the 2004 primary, 2004 general and 2006 primary elections are unreliable because of an aggregation of absentee and polling voters. We drop these elections owing to di¢ culty in separating the polling precinct voters from the absentee voters. Thus, the analyses focus on 1992-2002, except the California judicial retention questions, for which we use data from the 2006 general election. 13 Another concern is that precinct borders may change over time and thus the longitudinal dimension of the data may not be tracking a consistent unit of observation. For instance, the precinct "ALPINE 553110" in the 1992 primary might have di¤erent geographical boundaries 12 http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/voters/Eng/Eindex.html 13 Judicial retention contests appear in our data during the 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 general elections. than the precinct with the same label in the 1998 general election. This may be especially true in the 2002 and 2006 elections, which took place after the usual post-2000 Census redistricting. Conversations with the San Diego Registrar of Voters have suggested that these precinct boundaries changes are not a signi…cant problem because they are primarily used to keep the number of registered voters within a precinct roughly equal and new boundaries stay geographically and demographically close to the old boundaries. 14 A similar concern is the identi…cation of consistent precincts for absentee voters, which is important as we use precinct-level …xed e¤ects. Although it is possible to track the same polling precinct across elections, tracking is impossible for absentee voters because absentee precincts are de…ned by ballot types (all voters with an identical ballot) rather than all voters in the same area. Given that several precincts use the same ballot type and this group of precincts change (somewhat) over time, there is not a way to assign a consistent precinct to each absentee precinct. As an imperfect substitute, we …nd 646 groups of the 3825 polling precincts that often use similar ballot types over time to create a set of "grouped" precincts, which have a composition that is relatively consistent across time.
Finally, there are some changes in the set of overlaying political districts across time because of the 2000 Census redistricting and the creation and merging of local districts. This is a smaller issue as it does not a¤ect our primary source of variation within an election.
Choice Fatigue and the "Decision to Decide"
In this section, we focus on how the number of previous decisions in the electoral choice environment a¤ects a voter's decision to participate in voting on a particular contest, ignoring the actual decision made. As discussed in detail in the following section, this is accomplished by analyzing a natural experiment in which di¤erent voters see the same contest in di¤erent ballot positions because of di¤erences in the number of contests in the overlaying local political jurisdictions in which a voter lives.
Empirical Strategy
The estimates of the e¤ect of ballot position on the decision to cast a vote in a particular contest are identi…ed by exploiting exogenous variation in ballot position across precincts. The natural experiment providing the exogenous variation in ballot position is characterized 14 A related issue is the attrition and creation of precincts over the dataset because of population growth.
by As di¤erent precincts contain (potentially) di¤erent contests in various sections of the ballot, voters in these precincts will see the same contest (for example, Proposition 35) in later sections in di¤erent ballot positions.
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This variation is primarily because of the local contests, but the State Senate districts also provide some variation. Beyond the local political jurisdictions and State Senate districts, a third source of within-contest di¤erences in ballot position across voters is partisan ballots. In primary elections, it may be that the Democratic Party is running candidates in fewer statewide contests than the Republican party (this e¤ect is more pronounced with "third" parties that generally run candidates in only a few statewide contests). In this case, Republican voters will have made more decisions by the time they decide on the …rst statewide proposition. Unfortunately there is no by-party breakdown of votes cast for propositions and nonpartisan o¢ ces. However, we can use the variation by constructing ballot position for partisan voters in the same precinct as a registration-weighted average of the within-precinct ballot position for a given contest, across parties.
These factors generate signi…cant variation in the ballot position of the same contest across di¤erent voters. Note that some contests (such as Governor, President, Secretary of State, etc.) will appear at the same position (the top of the ballot) for all voters. These contests are dropped. To illustrate the variation that remains, Figure 3 describes the distribution of deviations from the mean ballot position in each contest for the four types of 15 Charter cities and counties are allowed ‡exibility in their elections code. Of the 4 charter cities in our dataset, the only deviation from the state elections code that is relevant to our dataset is discussed in section 5: the City of San Diego rotates city contest candidates in a di¤erent way than the state elections code.
16 §13115 of the California Elections Code states that proposition types appear on the ballot in the following order: bond measures, constitutional amendments, legislative measures, initiative measures and referendum measures.
17 A proposition quali…es for the ballot when the Secretary of State approves the submission of the required number of signatures petitioning to put the proposition on the ballot. The number of signatures required is 5% and 8% of the number of votes in the previous gubernatorial general election for initiatives and constitutional amendments, respectively.
18 Variation in the ballot across precincts arises from di¤erences in contests in the following sections: State Senator, County Board of Education Members, Community College Board Members, Uni…ed School Board Members, High School Board Members, Elementary School Board Members, Board of Supervisors, Mayor, City Council, Other City O¢ ces, Other District O¢ ces contests (this implicitly assumes the use of contest …xed-e¤ects, which are discussed below). Note that statewide propositions contain the most variation, followed by local propositions, elected o¢ ces, and statewide judicial o¢ ces. Furthermore, note that statewide propositions and judicial o¢ ces contain the most precinct-level observations per contest, as every voter observes these contests on their ballot. Many contest-level factors both a¤ect voter behavior and are potentially correlated with the ordering of the contest, such as saliency, expected contest closeness, and the size of polity. If each of these factors is not controlled for, any estimate of the e¤ect of ordering on voter outcomes will be potentially biased. However, controlling for these factors is extremely di¢ cult using observable contest characteristics. Fortunately, the natural experiment in this paper avoids this problem by allowing the identi…cation and inclusion of contest-speci…c …xed e¤ects, which fully control for all observable and unobservable contest-speci…c factors that might a¤ect voting behavior. The inclusion is a key contribution of this paper as it allows us to untangle the e¤ect of choice fatigue from the many explanations for voter behavior in a particular contest on the ballot.
One story which potentially voids this part of the identi…cation strategy is that there may be a selection bias generated by our primary source of exogenous variation. Consider a contest which appears 10 th on the ballot for some voters and 15 th for others. The contest appears 15 th as a result of more local o¢ ces appearing higher on the ballot. If that characteristic of the ballot -more local o¢ ces -causes the less informed voters to turnout, then the down-ballot fatigue e¤ects we purport to exist may actually be driven by the selection bias of voters who are more likely to undervote to the polls. Unfortunately, there is not a way to directly control for this e¤ect. However, we do not believe this is a threat to the identi…cation strategy for two reasons. First, we do not …nd it likely that this type of selection would be so consistently applied so as to bias the results exactly in the same way as our priors for the fatigue coe¢ cients. Second, in the results to follow we still …nd fatigue e¤ects for the contests highest up on the ballot (statewide judicial retention questions). These contests have variation of only one or two positions, and this variation is not caused by local political jurisdictions.
A similar concern is that there are precinct-level factors that both a¤ect voter behavior and are potentially correlated with the ordering of the contest. For example, it might be that some precincts tend to both participate less and also to have more local o¢ ces on the ballot. In this case, statewide propositions will appear relatively further down the ballot and observed increases in abstention will be caused by precinct di¤erences rather than position e¤ects. Fortunately, the longitudinal nature of the data permits the addition of precinct …xed e¤ects, which capture all observable and unobservable precinct-level factors that might a¤ect voter behavior.
Note that this approach assumes that the precinct-level e¤ects are constant over time. For example, consider a group of precincts that become wealthier and more educated over time (perhaps by gentri…cation). If this causes a change in the number of local elected contests on the ballot in these precincts as well as changes in voter behavior, then the e¤ects of ballot position on voter behavior could be mistaken for the e¤ects of changing demographics. In a similar manner to the potential concerns with contest …xed-e¤ects, we cannot control for this e¤ect. However, we …nd it unlikely to be particularly important as the direction of this e¤ect is not obvious and the ballot position e¤ects are mainly identi…ed by the within-election variation in ballot position.
With these points in mind, we claim that the ballot position of a given contest in a particular precinct is an exogenous determinant of the likelihood that a voter will abstain. The principal results in this section come from the estimation of the parameter U V in the following equation:
where U V ci denotes the percentage of undervotes in contest c and precinct i as a percentage of turnout in precinct i. Note that election dates are implicitly indexed by c because we de…ne a contest as a contest in a particular election, which appears on the ballot only once.
P OSIT ION ci refers to the ballot position of contest c in precinct i. For all regression results we include proposition and precinct …xed e¤ects c and f i , respectively. ci contains is the unobservable predictors of U V ci and is uncorrelated with any included regressors.
Results
Column 1 in Table 1 provides the estimate of equation 1. This benchmark speci…cation estimates that moving a particular contest down one position (thus increasing the number of decisions a voter makes before observing this contest by one) increases the number of undervotes by .129 points. Given that an average contest in the dataset appears at ballot position 15.7, this estimate suggests that undervotes would decrease by an average of 2 points if these contests appeared at the top of the ballot. As the average level of undervotes is 21.6%, this suggests that choice fatigue is responsible for 9.3% of undervotes in these contests.
Column 2 cuts the results by contest type (with separate precinct level …xed e¤ects for each type, which we do throughout the paper for all regressions with di¤erent types of contests, elections, or voters). The results for statewide propositions, local propositions, and o¢ ces have very similar point estimates of .07-.08 points. However, the estimate for judicial races (.411) is clearly signi…cantly larger than those for the other contest types, which is not surprising as judicial races induce more than twice the percentage of undervotes than other races (39% to 19%), presumably because statewide judicial retention contests are some of the lowest-salience contests on the ballot.
19 Similar logic to above (with type-speci…c statistics) suggests that undervotes for local propositions, statewide propositions, statewide judicial races, and o¢ ces would be reduced by 14.8%, 19.7%, 5.4%, and 8.9% if the contests appeared at the top of the ballot, respectively.
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19 Low saliency is the result of a variety of factors. First, the institution of electing judges is one of retention rather than competition. As a result, in the words of the California Courts'homepage, "Appellate court justices generally do not actively campaign for retention." Thus, voters probably have very low levels of information about these contests. Second, information provided on the ballot in these statewide judicial contests provides voters with no cues about ballot designation, partisan identi…cation, endorsements or incumbency. Instead, voters are simply asked questions such as, "Shall Presiding Justice Judith McConnell be elected to the o¢ ce for the term provided by law?" 20 Local propositions, statewide propositions, statewide judicial races, and o¢ ces appear on average at ballot positions 33. 1, 24.8, 18.6, and 8.4 , respectively, and have average undervote rates of 16.9%, 10.1%, 24.1%, and 39%, respectively. The regressions in Column 3 estimate primary and general election-speci…c coe¢ cients. The primary coe¢ cient is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting that the majority of the e¤ects of choice fatigue occur in general elections (where the coe¢ cient is .18). This is not surprising if, as described in Brockington (2003) , primary voters are more motivated than general election voters and high motivation mediates the e¤ects of choice fatigue.
Finally, Column 4 separates the sample by the absentee status of voters. Somewhat surprisingly, the coe¢ cient for the absentee voters is nearly three times that of voters that vote in polling places. One might predict a smaller or negligible choice fatigue e¤ect for absentee voters, as they have more time to vote, potentially more information at their disposal, and have been characterized as of a higher socioeconomic status and more politically active (Karp and Banducci 2001). As we will see in the following section, absentee voters are also more likely to choose the status quo when deciding. Our dataset does not allow us to determine the precise reason for this e¤ect, although selection e¤ects presumably play a role (absentee status is usually self-chosen by the voter).
Choice Fatigue and Choice Across Alternatives
The previous section analyzed the e¤ect of the number of previous decisions on the "decision to decide." Although this result provides evidence of choice fatigue, the economic impact is unclear. If voters that choose to abstain vote similarly to those who choose to vote, the abstentions will not a¤ect the result of the election. Consequently, in this section, we look at the changes in the actual decisions made by voters (conditional on making a decision) as they become fatigued by previous choices. Speci…cally, we examine the impact of fatigue on the likelihood of making decisions that maintain the status quo (voting "no" on propositions) or are extremely easy to process (voting for the candidate that is listed …rst). The empirical strategy, which is discussed separately for these two outcomes, is similar to that in the previous section.
The E¤ect of Fatigue on Maintaining the Status Quo in Propositions
In California, a "No" vote on statewide and local propositions always represents maintaining the status quo. Voters might have no information about changes implied by a particular proposition, or any desire to expend cognitive e¤ort to uncover this information. However, they are more likely to be familiar with the status quo given that they are currently living in the status quo environment. In this section, we analyze the impact of fatigue on the tendency to vote "no" on propositions.
Empirical Strategy
As discussed in section 4, the structure of the California ballot provides exogenous variation in ballot position of particular propositions, which we assume a¤ects the number of previous decisions made by a voter before confronting that proposition. To determine the e¤ect of ballot position on voting "no", we use the following general speci…cation:
where N O ci is de…ned to be the number of "no" votes in a contest as a fraction of the total votes cast in the contest (yes + no votes). To identify the parameter of interest N O , the identi…cation strategy employed for this model is exactly the same as in equation 1. Note that as the dependent variable is a fraction of the total yes and no votes cast in the contest, this equation is determined conditional on voting in the contest.
In addition, we will use a speci…cation similar to 2 with an interaction of the ballot position variable with (log) total campaign expenditures. This captures the e¤ect of contestspeci…c campaign expenditures on the ballot-position e¤ect. The expenditures data were taken from California Secretary of State's Cal-Access database as well as past issues of the now-defunct "Campaign Finance Reports" series. Table 2 provide the estimate of equation 2. This benchmark speci…cations estimate that moving a particular contest down one position increases the number of "no" votes by .11 points. Given that an average proposition race in our dataset appears at ballot position 26.8, this estimate suggests that "no" votes would decrease by an average of 2.9 points if these contests appeared at the top of the ballot. Given the average ballot position of each proposition, we calculate that 22 of the 352 propositions in our dataset would have passed rather than failed if the proposition was presented to voters as the …rst contest on the ballot. Column 2 compares the coe¢ cients for local and state propositions. The coe¢ cients are very economically similar, estimated at .125 and .102 respectively. Similarly, Column 3 displays primary and general election-speci…c coe¢ cients. As with the estimated coe¢ cients on the e¤ect of choice fatigue on undervotes in Section 4, the coe¢ cient for the general elections is signi…cantly higher than that for all elections, and the coe¢ cient for primary elections is lower (and, in this case, signi…cantly lower than zero). Again, this suggests that the high motivation associated with primary voters reduces the e¤ects of choice fatigue. The impact of absentee status is shown in Column 4. The estimate for absentee voters is higher than for those that vote in polling places, which is surprising, although consistent with the estimated coe¢ cients on undervotes for absentee voters in Section 4.
Results

Column 1 in
Finally, Column 5 provides the estimation of equation 2 with an added term that interacts ballot position with the log of campaign expenditures for state propositions. 21 Presumably, this variable provides a reasonable proxy for contest saliency, as we would expect that higher campaign spending would cause a contest to be better known and better-known races would receive more contributions (leading to higher spending). Our results suggest that higher expenditures lead to a mitigation of choice fatigue e¤ects, represented by the negative coef…cient on the "BP * Expend" term. To understand the economic impact of this coe¢ cient, …rst note that the log of expenditures are somewhat binary: zero expenditures occur in 25% of races, while log expenditures range from 10 and 17 (representing expenditures of $22,000 and $24 Million, respectively) for the other 75% of the races. The coe¢ cient for races with zero expenditures is relatively large at .324, while the coe¢ cient is relatively close to zero for the majority of races with positive expenditures. One obvious explanation of this …nding is that voters have not yet made decisions on election day on low-saliency elections, leaving them more susceptible to choice fatigue. This suggests that the estimates in previous sections are conservative, as they include situations in which voters have previously made a decision and therefore are not subject to choice fatigue.
The E¤ect of Fatigue on Voting for the First Candidate in Elections
As opposed to the "yes/no" questions of propositions, voters participating in elected o¢ ce contests vote for one or more candidates. In this section, we will analyze the e¤ect of choice fatigue on the tendency to choose the …rst candidate in the ordering, presumably the lowest-e¤ort decision shortcut possible. 22 21 We focus on state propositions because of data availability. 22 This Follows strong evidence seen in previous literature on ballot order e¤ects (Meredith and Salant 2007 , Miller and Krosnick 1998 , Koppel and Steen 2004 
Empirical Strategy
As in section 4, to separately identify ballot position coe¢ cients, …xed e¤ects for each contest and precinct are included in each speci…cation. In addition, another natural experiment permits the addition of candidate-speci…c …xed e¤ects in this section. For almost all elected o¢ ces on the ballot, the ordering of candidates is determined by the drawing of a random alphabet by the Secretary of State. 23 For some of these o¢ ces, candidates are rotated across speci…c subsets of precincts within the o¢ ce's political jurisdiction. 24 This rotation places the same candidate at di¤erent within-contest positions in di¤erent precincts, allowing the estimation of candidate-speci…c …xed e¤ects to control for all candidate-speci…c observables and unobservables.
This three-way …xed e¤ects model is quite a large computational task, with 950,482 polling precinct observations, 408,990 absentee precinct observations, 3473 precinct e¤ects, 509 candidate e¤ects and 195 contest e¤ects in the dataset. With these three sets of …xed e¤ects included in the regression, the primary goal is to estimate the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between ballot position and a dummy variation F IRST that represents that a candidate is that the top of the within-contest ordering:
where voteshare coi is the percentage of the total votes cast in contest o that candidate c receives in precinct i; and c , f i ; c represent proposition, precinct, and candidate …xed e¤ects, respectively. We interpret the coe¢ cient as the e¤ect to a candidate's vote share of appearing …rst in the contest ordering, while the coe¢ cient is interpreted as the additional e¤ect on candidate's vote-share of appearing …rst for each single change in ballot position of the contest. Note that P OSIT ION does not enter the equation by itself. Given that this analysis depends on a vote being cast in the contest, P OSIT ION does not belong in the regression model as a predictor of candidate vote share in a particular contest because it is constant within a contest. As a result, it only acts as a conduit to examine the interactions of fatigue with the tendency to vote for the …rst candidate listed.
Results
Column 1 in Table 3 provide the estimate of equation 3. This benchmark speci…cation demonstrates both that appearing …rst in the intra-contest ordering has a signi…cant positive impact on the candidate's vote-share of .50 points, and that choice fatigue has a signi…cant impact on the tendency to use this shortcut. Speci…cally, moving the contest down one position increases the expected vote-share of the …rst candidate by .057 points. As the average o¢ ce race in our dataset appears at ballot position 8.9, this estimate suggests that the …rst candidate receives, on average, an additional .51 points because of choice fatigue. Column 2 estimates a separate coe¢ cient for state and local o¢ ces, suggesting similar e¤ects across contest types. Column 3 displays the e¤ect by election type, suggesting (as in the previous regressions above) that the e¤ect is larger for voters in general elections than primary elections. Finally, Column 4 separates the e¤ect for polling and absentee voters. Unlike the previous regressions above, we …nd no signi…cant di¤erence in the e¤ect across di¤erent types of voters.
Discussion and Conclusion Discussion
Even though the empirical application in this paper focuses on voter behavior, the strength of the identi…cation strategy and established evidence suggest that it is reasonable to extrapolate the results to a broader set of consumer and economic choice problems in which a person makes a bundle of decisions. If …rms or policy makers know about this characteristic of decision behavior, then this may in ‡uence their strategy in how they order decisions or disseminate information.
For example, it is not unusual for consumers shopping online for electronics to be offered the possibility to compare the attributes of a handful of similar items. If consumers experience fatigue while comparing a long list of attributes, then a retailer may strategically place attributes at particular positions in the comparison sequence to mitigate or exacerbate fatigue. Evidence of the importance of this type of strategic behavior is highlighted in Levav et al. (2007) , which focuses on the full customization of a single product rather than the comparison of products. Presumably, a …rm's optimal strategy is dependent on level of naiveness of the consumer about this behavioral tendency, which we are unable to estimate with our dataset.
Portfolio choice and diversi…cation is another commonly-studied task that involves bundled decisions. If decision making among investors in 401(k) funds is susceptible to fatigue, a benevolent planner will take care in the dissemination of information concerning the investment options and the ordering of decisions. In particular, if some decisions carry more weight in terms of utility (for example, equity fund investments), then these decisions should be placed towards the beginning of the decision sequence so as to minimize the likelihood that the investor is fatigued and making less-than-careful decisions. Similarly, the results also potentially have implications for other applications in decision making such as health plan selection (see McFadden 2005) , car insurance interviews and the physical arrangement of items in a store.
As our result directly concerns voting behavior, we will discuss several theoretical and practical implications relevant this context. First, special interest groups may want to exploit the control that they have over the position in which their proposition appears on the ballot. For example, citizens'initiatives appear in the order in which they qualify and thus it may be optimal for the group to qualify their proposition as early as possible if they wish to minimize the "no" e¤ect from voter fatigue. Alternatively, it also makes sense for these actors to consider proposition placement across elections, given that the top of the ballot is signi…cantly longer in gubernatorial elections.
Second, and in a similar vein to the …rst point, the evidence provided may contribute to the literature on the endogenous timing of school bond elections (Romer & Rosenthal 1978 , Meredith 2006 ). This research suggests that an agenda setter may …nd it optimal to put a school bond proposition on the ballot in o¤-year special elections when the electorate who chooses to turn out will be relatively motivated in favor of passage of the bond. The evidence in this paper suggests another reason to take this strategy: propositions listed towards the end of the ballot are more likely to experience "yes" votes when placed on a relatively short special election ballot.
Third, a theoretical result by Besley and Coate (2000) …nds that there are welfare gains to the unbundling of policies from candidates (the addition of initiatives to the ballot as a separate contest to the candidate election). Our result suggests a potential problem with this method, as an increase in the number of decisions will increase choice fatigue and consequently bias decisions.
Fourth, if the documented fatigue e¤ect is undesirable, then elections o¢ cials could consider randomizing the order in which the contests appear on the ballot to remove the position e¤ects. Although this may be impractical for the entire ballot, even a within-block randomization would partially mitigate the e¤ects. A large body of previous work on the e¤ects of candidate position within a contest Miller 1998, Koppell and Steen 2004 ) is in line with our work and con…rms that order matters. A few States have begun to randomize candidate orderings across precincts in an election, suggesting that elections o¢ cials may be open to the idea.
Fifth, if voters experience choice fatigue and this a¤ects their ability to participate in the democratic process, then elections o¢ cials may want to think about either limiting the length of ballots or holding more frequent elections. As an example, Canada holds national and local elections on separate dates.
Finally, if having the ballot at home for a period of time mitigates the position e¤ects, elections o¢ cials may want to increase e¤orts to convert citizens from polling station voters to absentee voters. However, although this solution seems intuitive, our results suggest that absentee voters are actually more likely to be a¤ected by choice fatigue. This might be a result of selection (most absentee voters choose this status), which we cannot distinguish in our data.
Conclusion
This paper isolates the e¤ect of choice fatigue on voting behavior through a natural experiment in which the same ballot contest appears at di¤erent positions across voters. We are able to separate the e¤ects of choice fatigue from other competing explanations of choice behavior as a result of this exogenous variation in the number of previous decisions made by the voter. We …nd that voters are more likely to abstain and more likely to rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo or the …rst candidate listed in a race, as the ballot position of a contest falls. In terms of economic impact, we estimate that if an average contest was placed at the top of the ballot, undervotes would decrease by 10%, the percentage of no votes on propositions would fall by 2.9 points, and the percentage of votes for the …rst candidate would fall by .5 points.
The results have broad implications for economic choice and for the design of electoral institutions, which o¤er opportunities for future work. For example, this paper does not distinguish between decisions with di¤erent levels of complexity, which presumably a¤ects the level of choice fatigue induced by making the decision. This suggests a possible interaction between for the fatigue e¤ects documented here and the "choice overload" phenomenon discussed in Iyengar and Lepper (2000) .
The fact that decision outcomes are dependent on the number of previous decisions made is presumably useful to creators of decision making environments, such as a company or policy maker. For example, as we estimate that some contests would have di¤erent outcomes if placed at the top of the ballot, governments might consider enacting policies to limit the number of decisions on an individual ballot or act to encourage spreading these decisions over a longer time.
